



FACTSHEET

REGARDING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 43 STUDENTS IN IGUALA, GUERRERO AND SECURITY IN MEXICO.

- 1) The events in the municipality of Iguala were barbaric, tragic, painful and unacceptable. These violent crimes have generated social outrage because they involve the disappearance of innocent students and because local authorities were involved. Mexican society can relate to the great pain that this causes to the families of the victims, they are someone's sons or brothers. These crimes are a wake up call and a sign that the progress that has been made in security and justice in Mexico has yet to reach some municipalities like Iguala and some states like Guerrero.
- 2) The coordinated actions and investigation of the federal government have made significant progress in a relatively short period of time. In 33 days, the federal government has arrested the former Mayor of Iguala and his wife, who gave the initial orders to capture the students. The Mexican government has also detained a total of 74 people, including 36 municipal police officers along with members of the criminal group *Guerreros Unidos*, its leader and its top financial operative. Three of those detained confessed to kidnapping and killing a group of young men and their confession led to an area where ashes and other human remains were found. The state of those remains makes it impossible to rapidly identify the victims, but we are moving as fast as possible with help from the best scientists in the world.

Federal security forces, including the Federal Police, the Gendarmerie, and the Army have taken over all public security activities in 15 municipalities of the state of Guerrero. All local police forces have been removed from their posts and are subject to certification and retraining processes.

- 3) These crimes also have a human rights component. The Mexican Government believes that human rights are not only an ethical imperative,

but also a basic principle of operational effectiveness. No security, police or justice reform can have the legitimacy it needs to succeed unless it is rooted in international Human Rights Standards. That is why the Mexican government is working with the Interamerican Human Rights Commission to ensure technical assistance during the investigations of this tragedy.

FAQs

Was Iguala a crime of State? Is there a state policy of Human Rights violations? Does this case exemplify a State policy of systematic violation of human rights?

- **Absolutely not.** What we see in Iguala are local authorities who abuse their power to commit crimes, but we also see the State acting against them. Keep in mind that practically every local authority involved in the Iguala case has been detained and is being prosecuted.

Why did the Federal Government allow Ayotzinapa to happen? // Why did it take so long for the authorities to get involved in this case?

- This is not the case. From the outset, the appropriate authorities have taken action. Mexico has a federal system with municipal, state, and federal governments. From day one, the Guerrero state attorney initiated an investigation with assistance from the Federal Government. With the first evidence that organized crime was possibly involved, the Attorney General took over the case. But aside from the criminal investigation, federal security agencies became involved in securing the area and searching for the students from the first moment.

Why these students? What motive could anyone have to kidnap them or kill them?

- None. These were innocent students training to become teachers. They were taken to Iguala on their way to Mexico City, where they would participate in a demonstration to commemorate the student killings of 1968. That day in Iguala, the mayor's wife was giving a political speech. We now know that the mayor, his wife, and the local police, had ties to organized crime. When the students arrived in Iguala, the local police believed they were there to disrupt the mayor's event. The mayor thus gave the order for the police to capture the students. During that confrontation 6 people were killed and 43 students were kidnapped and handed over to the criminal organization, Guerreros Unidos. At that point, the leader of Guerreros

Unidos received a text message that indicated that the captured students were members of a rival gang, called Los Rojos, and were trying to enter the Iguala territory. The leader of Guerreros Unidos gave the order to “proceed against them.” This is what we know so far.

Mexicans have voiced their frustration at the lack of concluding results in the investigations.

- The Mexican government has devoted every resource possible to this case. More than 10,000 people have been involved in investigation, security, and search operations. 74 people have been detained, including former Mayor Abarca and his wife. Three of those detained confessed to kidnapping and killing a group of young men and their confession led to an area where ashes and other human remains were found. The state of those remains makes it impossible to rapidly identify the victims, but we are moving as rapidly as possible with help from the best scientists in the world.

During investigations, several mass graves were found, with many bodies. Who are those people?

- (There are 11 graves and 38 bodies.) Four bodies have been identified so far, belonging to people who had been reported missing in the area. We are still conducting investigations to identify the other bodies. Evidence suggests that they don't belong to the missing students. In Iguala, what we know is that local authorities were working together with organized crime. These graves are a reflection of the atrocities they were involved in.

Are the students dead?

- There are strong indications that they may have been killed, but the Mexican Government through the Attorney General will continue to explore every possible alternative until there is clear confirmation of one or another outcome. What we do know is that on that day, a large group of young men was killed, incinerated, and disposed of by members of the criminal group: Guerreros Unidos. We have yet to confirm that those young men were indeed the missing students.

Why did the Federal Government not act before against Abarca and his wife? // Didn't everybody know that the mayor and his wife were criminals? Why didn't the government act?

- It was acting, as much as it could. There had been indications that Mr. Abarca had been involved in a murder. The state prosecutor – legally

capable of taking action in a murder case – was investigating the murder. The Attorney General had also opened an investigation for ties to organized crime that in fact resulted in an immediate arrest warrant when Mr. Abarca was captured. Prosecutors cannot act based on hearsay, they must act based on evidence.

Why did no federal force intervene to defend the students?

- They could not. There is a military base in the Iguala region, but the only available information that day was that there was a confrontation between the local police and a civilian group. Legally, if the army or the federal police had intervened, it would have been in *defense of the local authority*, which in this case was acting *against* civilians. In the heat of the moment it was impossible to know. Legally, federal forces can only intervene when a local authority requests their support *or* when there is a federal crime being committed.

Is this an isolated case? / Citizens' reaction seems to suggest it is more generalized? / What is the context for this horrifying event?

- a) This is *not* a generalized situation in the country. Most areas of Mexico live in peace and have strong and reliable institutions. However, there are indeed places in Mexico where organized crime has infiltrated municipal authorities. Although it is localized, it is unacceptable, as the consequences can be, as in this case, devastating. The citizens' reaction is not only understandable, but is also shared by the Mexican government as a whole. We are all outraged, we are all devastated. This is a tragedy and the federal government is acting and will continue to act in consequence. We must make sure that the progress that has been made to improve security in Mexico is brought down to every municipality in the country.

This is especially true in areas of Mexico that, given their social and geographic characteristics like rugged terrain, a population fragmented in several ethnic or cultural groups, and a lack of clear economic competitive advantages have been historically difficult to integrate into the country's economic, social, and political progress. This is most notable in the southwestern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca.

Has there been cooperation from the U.S.? International agencies?

- The federal government has formally requested technical assistance from the Inter American Human Rights Commission. The U.S. has provided

assistance in the investigations in the form of intelligence and forensic analysts.

Why did the president leave for China?

- The President must be present where he is most needed. As a father, he would have preferred to stay in Mexico. As a president, he had to honor Mexico's global commitments, while ensuring that the Federal Government continues its tireless efforts to find the students. It is important to clarify that the president decided to cut the trip short.

APEC is a less structured meeting between heads of state, which allows for substantive and open conversations on matters of immediate urgency that no other forum allows for. The G20 is the most important forum for matters of the global economy. In both cases, only heads of state can attend.

What happens next? How do we prevent this from happening again?

- **First** we must finish our current investigation. That is the priority. There are 43 families that are under an incredible amount of suffering. There are six other families that are mourning their deaths. Our first commitment is to them and we will not rest until we can give them more certainty. **Second**, we must not allow this tragedy to have happened in vain. The President has already made it clear that Iguala will be a turning point, that the Mexican Government we will take decisive and structural actions to tackle the root of the Iguala tragedy at the social, institutional, and public security levels.

How is this related to other cases, such as Tlatlaya?

- The Mexican Government has demonstrated no tolerance for authorities that abuse their power to commit crimes. Both in Iguala and Tlatlaya, the perpetrators were apprehended and are being prosecuted. In the case of Tlatlaya, 8 members of the military are in custody.

Why did the Attorney General say he had "had enough"?

- The Attorney General has already clarified this. He said it in the context of not having slept for forty hours and being in a press conference that was already generating repeated questions.

Are things turning violent in Mexico? Is there a governability concern? We saw images of protesters burning the main door of the national palace.

- Absolutely not. Those images happened at the end of a peaceful

demonstration. As it sometimes happens in every country, at the end of the demonstration a minority of individuals engaged in acts of vandalism that were isolated and that had no major consequence. The president was already traveling, which was widely known, and he normally does not work from that building. So, it was an isolated and minor event.

An update on the current situation in Guerrero
Last updated November 5, 2014

Facts

During the night between September 26 and September 27, the police force of the municipality of Iguala opened fire against 3 buses transporting students from the Teachers' School of Ayotzinapa, as well as against a fourth bus transporting the *Chilpancingo Hornets* soccer team.

- 43 people are still missing. 6 civilians have been killed and 17 wounded.
- It has come to light that the mayor of Iguala, Mr. Abarca, and his wife, Ms. Pineda, have ties to local organized crime, in particular to a local splinter group, *Guerreros Unidos*. This partnership also permeated the local police force.
- On the afternoon of September 26, Ms. Pineda was preparing to give a political speech to report on her activities as president of the local DIF (family services).
- That same afternoon, students from the teacher school of Ayotzinapa had entered Iguala to forcefully borrow two private buses to head into Mexico City and join protests commemorating the student killings of October 2, 1968. The students had already secured two buses from a similar visit to Chilpancingo.
- Given a recent conflict between the Ayotzinapa students and Iguala police, the students' presence was interpreted by the local police as an attempt to

disrupt Ms. Pineda's political rally. In consequence, Mr. Abarca ordered the police of Iguala to intercept the students. The municipal police force of bordering Cocula – also infiltrated by organized crime – was also alerted.

- During the initial confrontation, an Iguala police officer shot and killed one of the students. In the confusion that ensued as Iguala and Cocula police officers tried to capture fleeing students, 6 civilians were killed and 17 wounded.
- 43 students were captured and sent to the Iguala police headquarters. From there, they were taken by Cocula officers in an unmarked truck and handed over to the *Guerreros Unidos* criminal organization. The 43 students have been missing since that moment.
- The leader of *Guerreros Unidos* had been informed, via a text message, that the conflict in Iguala had in fact been instigated by a rival group, "Los Rojos," in an attempt to enter Iguala to dispute the territory.

Federal Government Actions

- The case has been attracted by the Attorney General's Office and is currently led by the Attorney General, Mr. Jesus Murillo Karam.
- The Federal Government's priority remains to find the missing students, as well as capture the individuals responsible for the forced disappearance and to finish dismantling the criminal structure that operates in the region.
- On November 4, Mr. Abarca and Ms. Pineda were detained in Mexico City. There is an outstanding warrant for the Iguala minister of security, Mr. Flores.
- As of today, the Federal Government has also detained a total of 74 people, including 36 municipal police officers (24 from Iguala, 12 from Cocula) and members of *Guerreros Unidos*, including its leader, its top financial operative, and the members allegedly responsible for capturing and transferring the students.
- The Federal security forces, including the Federal Police, the Gendarmerie, and the Army have taken over all public security activities in 15

municipalities of Guerrero. All local police forces have been removed from their posts and are being subject to certification and retraining processes. Their weapons have been confiscated to run ballistic tests and their compliance with federal licensing laws.

- There is a search and rescue operation of unprecedented breadth underway.
- There are more than 10,000 members of the federal police, the army, the navy, and the prosecutor's office in Guerrero engaged in public security activities.
- The Federal Government has requested the Inter American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) for its technical assistance to develop an Integrated Victims Attention Plan in accordance to international Human Rights standards. The missing students' families and legal representatives have been granted full access to the investigation files so they can aid in the investigation process.
- In response to a request by the victims' families, a group of forensic experts have been asked to help with the investigation.
- As part of the search and rescue operations, a series of graves (11) have been found. So far, around 38 bodies have been retrieved. While initial forensic tests did not confirm that the bodies belonged to any of the missing students, additional tests are being carried out.
- Three members of Guerreros Unidos have confessed to killing a group of young men handed over to them by the Cocula police, and disposing of the bodies by burning them. Based on these confessions, human remains have been retrieved from a dumpster and a creek. Identification of the remains will take considerable time given their state (DNA testing is not possible).
- The governor of Guerrero, Mr. Angel Aguirre Rivero has formally requested the state's Congress to grant him permanent leave from his position. The Guerrero congress has chosen Salvador Rogelio Ortega, former Secretary General of the Guerrero Autonomous University, as the new governor.

The Administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto is fully committed to finding the 43 students and to ensuring that all the individuals responsible for the murder

and disappearance of civilians in Iguala are brought to justice and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Investigations are still underway and the information contained in this document will change rapidly. The Administration is also fully committed to a transparent investigation process that keeps all concerned citizens informed, so information will be shared as it becomes available.

IGUALA IN CONTEXT

Recent unfortunate events, most notably in Iguala, have put a spotlight on some of the challenging realities that Mexico still faces and have understandably generated some concerns and questions about how these events fit into the more positive –but equally present—realities that have received much more attention in the past few months. This text will first comment on the larger context that helps interpret the events in Iguala, to later discuss the events themselves, and then comment on the most important question of how this fits into the broader transformation that we are pursuing in Mexico.

1. Brief background on the broader institutional context.

Contrary to popular belief and common public narratives, Mexico does not have a drug trade problem. Rather, it has a public security problem that has been greatly amplified by the drug trade. Put differently, Mexico's public security issues are not the direct result of the evolution of organized crime nor are they limited to the effects, size, and dynamics of criminal organizations. Conversely, violence related to organized crime is not the direct result of Mexico's public security shortcomings, as organized crime follows its own logic and dynamics. What *is* true, however, is that organized crime has taken advantage of Mexico's institutional and public security weaknesses to expand its influence, and criminal organizations have greatly amplified Mexico's public security problem.

This public security problem traces its roots to three structural elements of the institutional configuration of the country that were functional for the historical moment when they were implemented but that have decreased their appropriateness as the country has evolved: (1) the *political* origins of the country's security forces, (2) the democratization process and its accompanying effect of weakening the federal executive power, and (3) the process of decentralization of power in the country.

a) Political origins of security forces.

Mexico's history up to the Revolution had been defined by the use of armed conflict to subvert and redefine political power. As a result, and to create a more stable arrangement, during the post-revolution period the ruling party established a corporatist political system. In addition, consecutive federal administrations split the country's coercive power into four security forces, all under the direct command of the President, that could neutralize each other in the event of an insurgency: the national army, the national navy, the presidential corps (Estado Mayor), and the Distrito Federal Police force. It is important to emphasize that these security forces were designed for national security and political stability, not for public security.

b) Decentralization of power.

Starting in 1993, there has been a steady transfer of economic and political power away from the federal government and into state and municipal administrations. In particular, in 1993 the decision was made to transfer all public security responsibilities to municipal governments, away from the state administrations. The rationale was to nest public security within the administrative body closest to the population and to local problems and realities. Nevertheless, in some cases the municipalities were ill prepared to face the economic burden or didn't have the knowledge or the mechanisms of accountability to take their new responsibilities. This is especially true in peripheral areas of Mexico that, given their social and geographic characteristics like rugged terrain, a population fragmented in several ethnic or cultural groups, and a lack of clear economic competitive advantages have been historically difficult to integrate into the country's economic, social, and political progress. This is most notable in the southwestern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. These shortcomings often resulted, among other things, in local police forces that were not trained following appropriate standards, did not have mechanisms of incentives and accountability, and were too small for the dimension and the complexity of the problems they faced

c) Democratization of Mexico.

Since the pluralization of Congress in 1997, there has been a steady transfer of power away from the Executive branch (the President). Both the Judicial (through a mostly successful judicial reform) and the Legislative (through electoral dynamics) powers have become stronger curbs on the Executive. In addition, both electoral dynamics that have created a more varied

political map and a series of legal transfers of political power and financial resources have transferred power from the Federal Government to State Governments.

In this dynamic, it is important to highlight that it is often the case that different parties rule at different levels, so there can be a municipality run by the PRD within a state governed by PAN under a presidential administration from the PRI. Without mechanisms of transparency, accountability, and transfer of responsibility each level can be territorial and outright confrontational in its exercise of power vis-à-vis the other two. This is amplified by a divided congress and the Mexican system of party discipline, where the municipal president of a small town in any state can use all his power and resources – including the local police force – to play out a political battle between two parties in congress.

All of this can help explain why organized crime has amplified Mexico's public security problem: in a divided institutional landscape; with atomized security forces with enormous diversity of resources, training, and skill; with often misaligned and confronted incentives across levels of government that have few mechanisms of accountability; and with the corrupting capacity of organized crime, it is easier for criminal organizations to find municipal presidents to coopt because they are either weak, corrupt, or focused on their hyper-local economic or political calculations – and not focused enough on broader institutional implications. North American demand for illicit drugs, coupled with U.S. supply of weapons to criminal organizations have amplified these structural issues to their current dimension.

That said, Mexico does not face a National Security crisis. Rather, it is facing a public security problem with different levels of intensity in different regions and states. It also has successful examples at the local and state levels, where the decisive action of the three levels of government, with the active participation of civil society, has overcome temporary moments of crisis. The recent examples of Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez show cities that were critically affected by organized crime but where a broad partnership between the Federal Government, the State Government, the municipalities, local citizens, the private sector, and NGOs radically altered the landscape, putting the two cities on a virtuous and positive path. The state of Nuevo Leon provides a useful example of a state where, facing a complex public security problem, organized citizens pressured and then partnered with the State Government to completely reshape its approach to public security, radically reforming its police forces and redesigning its institutional configuration,

also placing the entire state on much more solid (and secure) footing. Even the state of Michoacan, where state and municipal institutions of the state had been weakened, is now turning a corner following an assertive intervention by the federal government, supported by the national army, the navy, and the federal police.

2. An update on the current situation in Guerrero.

Facts

- 43 students are still missing. 6 civilians have been killed and 17 wounded.
- It has come to light that the mayor of Iguala, Mr. Abarca, and his wife, Ms. Pineda, have deep and longstanding ties to local organized crime, in particular to a local splinter group called “Guerreros Unidos.” This partnership also permeated the entire municipal administration, including the local police force.
- On the afternoon of September 26, Ms. Pineda was preparing to give a political speech at an event that was part of a broader strategy to place her in position to contend for the position of municipal president during the upcoming elections.
- That same afternoon, students from the left-leaning teacher school of Ayotzinapa had entered Iguala to “commission” (forcefully borrow) two private buses to head into Mexico City and join protests commemorating the student killings of October 2, 1968. The students had already secured two buses from a similar visit to Chilpancingo. Given recent conflict between the Ayotzinapa students and Iguala police, the students’ presence was interpreted by the local police as an attempt to disrupt Ms. Pineda’s political rally. In consequence, Mr. Abarca ordered the police of Iguala to intercept the students. The municipal police force of bordering Cocula – also infiltrated by organized crime – was also alerted.
- During the initial confrontation, an Iguala police officer shot and killed one of the students. In the confusion that ensued as Iguala and Cocula police officers tried to capture fleeing students, 5 additional civilians were killed and 17 wounded (including civilians traveling with a local soccer club, whose bus was mistaken to be part of the Ayotzinapa caravan).
- 43 students were captured and sent to the Iguala police headquarters. From there, they were taken by Cocula officers in an unmarked truck and handed over to the *Guerreros Unidos* criminal organization. The 43 students have been missing since that moment.
- The leader of *Guerreros Unidos* had been informed, via a text message, that

the students in fact belonged to a rival group, “Los Rojos,” and had attempted to enter Iguala to dispute the territory.

Federal Government Actions

- As of today, the Federal Government has detained 74 people, including 36 municipal police officers (24 from Iguala, 12 from Cocula) and members of *Guerreros Unidos*, including its leader, its top financial operative, and the members allegedly responsible for capturing and transferring the students.
- Mr. Abarca and Ms. Pineda were arrested on November 4. There is an outstanding warrant for the Iguala minister of security, Mr. Flores.
- The Federal security forces, including the Federal Police, the Gendarmerie, and the Army have taken over all public security activities in 15 municipalities of Guerrero. All local police forces have been removed from their posts and are being subject to certification and retraining processes. Their weapons have been confiscated to run ballistic tests and ensure their compliance with licensing laws.
- There is a search and rescue operation of unprecedented breadth underway.
- There are more than 10,000 members of the federal police, the army, the navy, and the prosecutor’s office in Guerrero engaged in public security activities.
- The Federal Government has requested the Inter American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) for its technical assistance to develop an Integrated Victims Attention Plan in accordance to international Human Rights standards. The missing students’ families and legal representatives have been granted full access to the investigation files so they can aid in the investigation process. This level of engagement with the victims is also a reflection of the transformation of the criminal law system in Mexico, where in the past, the authorities had full control of the investigation and did not consult with the victims.
- Three members of *Guerreros Unidos* have confessed to killing a group of young men handed over to them by the Cocula police, and disposing of the bodies by burning them. Based on these confessions, human remains have been retrieved from a dumpster and a creek. Identification of the remains will take considerable time given their state.
- The Federal Government’s priority remains to find the missing students, as well as capture the individuals responsible for the forced disappearance and to finish dismantling the criminal structure that operates in the region.
- The governor of Guerrero, Mr. Angel Aguirre Rivero has formally requested the state’s Congress to grant him permanent leave from his position. The

Guerrero congress has chosen Salvador Rogelio Ortega, former Secretary General of the Guerrero Autonomous University, as the new governor.

3. How does this fit into the broader Mexican context, and most important, where is Mexico headed?

From the beginning of his administration, President Peña Nieto has recognized that there are two preconditions for prosperity: (a) macroeconomic stability and competitiveness and (b) the certainty and tranquility that comes with public security.

To pursue the first precondition of economic stability and growth, the EPN administration has remained committed to macroeconomic stability and has carried out an unprecedented process of structural reforms that have placed Mexico on much more solid footing in its path towards economic competitiveness.

To pursue Public Security, the second precondition for prosperity, the Peña Nieto administration recently (in April of 2014) summarized its security strategy in the “Program for National Security, 2014-2018.” The document reveals the administration’s broad reconceptualization of National Security through a multi-dimensional lens that includes any and all factors that are required to guarantee the security, stability, and well-being of all Mexican citizens. This reconceptualization of National Security thus results in a National Security strategy that is holistic in its approach, integrating human, political, and economic factors that can affect the development and stability of the Mexican State.

The Program for National Security is thus composed of four large National Programs, coordinated through a National Security Council and supported by a strengthened National Intelligence System. Most important, the Program aims to create a true Culture of National Security that is rooted in a collective ethic of citizen rights that is balanced by a collective recognition of the need for a strong State. The four programs include the National Defense Program, the National Justice Procurement Program, the National Program for the Social Prevention of Violence, and the National Public Security Program.

Regarding public security, the National Public Security Program articulates a broader, holistic approach around the following principles:

- A unified and coordinated approach across agencies and, most important, across levels of government. While the National Security Council will coordinate all Public Security activities to provide intelligence and operative support as needed, it is recognized that state and municipal governments are the lynchpins of any security strategy and thus must be properly supported but also held responsible.
- A strong focus on addressing the root causes of crime to strengthen the social fabric and prevent (rather than react to) violence. This includes programs like “Nos Mueve la Paz” and “Prospera.”
- The recognition that the strategy must be deeply committed to human rights, not as an ethical matter, but as a matter of operational effectiveness. No security program can be enacted without the trust and legitimacy of the population:
 - A new National Human Rights Program (PNDH) was created, which recognizes the multi-level nature of human rights and thus creates appropriate mechanisms for cross-level and cross-agency coordination on human rights issues and standards.
 - Mexico has ratified and signed all major international human rights treaties and accords.
 - The rules of engagement and the laws regulating all federal security forces have been modified to align them with international human rights standards, as published in the new “Protocol for the Use of Force, mandatory for the three Armed Services,” and the General Victims’ Law.
 - New laws have been passed whereby military violations of citizens’ rights will be addressed in civil, not military courts.
 - There has been significant progress on emblematic cases, like the recent detention of 20 current and former government officials from the State of Mexico, in addition to two state police officers, who were all presumably involved in the 2006 human rights violations at San Salvador Atenco.
- A regional approach to better detect needs and funnel resources. The country has been divided into five regions to better identify specific needs and to increase each region’s response capabilities.
- More intelligence, less force: It proposes a full restructuring of all intelligence capabilities, establishing clear protocols for the gathering and sharing of operative and strategic intelligence across agencies, regions, and

levels of government. This focus on intelligence has resulted in the capture of 87 of the 122 most wanted criminals in Mexico, most of them without any shots fired.

- An immediate focus on reducing high-impact crime including murder, kidnapping, and extortion.
- The strengthening and professionalization of security forces.
 - The Federal Police has gone from 6,000 members in 2000 to 45,000 members today, including 5,000 in the Gendarmerie (a professional, highly trained force for territorial control and intervention in situations of high organized crime presence).
 - The concentration and centralization of municipal police forces into a “single command” and in some cases a single police force at the state level.
- Enhanced international cooperation to better control the borders and address the changing reality of multi-national criminal organizations. This includes the Merida initiative, the partnership for a XXI Century border, and the expansion of the Mexican approach to the Southern border.
- Criminal law must be improved to reduce impunity and deliver justice:
 - Criminal law, previously atomized into 33 state criminal codes, has been standardized into one national code.
 - The Attorney General’s Office was endowed with constitutional autonomy, for more effective investigation and prosecution of crimes.
 - Judicial reform, which will be fully implemented by 2016, has established the use of adversarial, accusatory, oral trials, respectful of victims’ rights.
- The political reform now allows for reelection of municipal officials, to lengthen their terms and better align their incentives.

The current situation in Iguala and Guerrero is unacceptable. The Federal Government is fully committed to finding the 43 students and ensuring that impunity does not reign in this terrible incident. The administration of President Peña Nieto is fully aware of Mexico’s Public Security situation and is fully committed to establishing the two preconditions for prosperity: economic stability and growth and security. There are a number of important, structural actions that are underway to improve public security, but many of these interventions and reforms have longer cycles, so their results will continue to emerge in the coming months and years.